Tieteellisen hypoteesin tarkoituksena on selittää jokin ilmiö tai joukko ilmiöitä. Yleensä hypoteesi postuloi ilmiön tai ilmiöiden syyksi tai selitykseksi jonkun syyn, joka on tietynlainen suhteessa ilmiöön, jonka se pyrkii selittämään. Tämä syy voi olla joko havaittu tai havaitsematon. Tieteessä on monia havaitsemattomia, ns. “teoreettisia entiteettejä”, kuten kvarkkeja ja elektroneja, jotka postuloidaan, koska teoriat, jotka sisältävät [...]
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Luokassa Teismi ja selitys on Jou 1. 2010
1. ‘The Problem of Theism and Explanation’: A Reply to Luke (Part I)
2. ‘The Problem of Theism and Explanation’: A Reply to Luke (Part II)
3. ‘The Problem of Theism and Explanation’: A Reply to Luke (Part III)
4. ‘The Problem of Theism and Explanation’: A Reply to Luke (Part IV)
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Luokassa Teismi ja selitys on Jou 1. 2010
Personal Explanation and the Philosophy of Mind
I want to address one more thing. That is the question of ‘personal’ or ‘intentional’ or ‘psychological’ explanations. Luke or someone questioning this argument will probably say that theism´s explanatory power is not so good. Luke could ask for example that “how does the existence of God really explain [...]
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Luokassa Teismi ja selitys on Jou 1. 2010
In the last two parts I summarized Swinburne´s criteria for the justification of explanation and defended them. In this part I will make an outline of an inference to the best explanation-type argument for theism.
Theism As a Metaphysical Hypothesis
Before I proceed, it is also worthwhile to notice that, at least for the purposes of an [...]
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Luokassa Teismi ja selitys on Jou 1. 2010
Last time I argued that a good scientific (or meta-scientific) hypothesis must satisfy only four or three explanatory criteria, not ten or so like Luke likes to argue in his blog. But aren´t some criteria missing here? In this post I will be quoting Swinburne at lenght.
Swinburne on Prediction
One criterion that is missing is ‘predictive [...]
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